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CASES NOTED
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS
VOTER LOYALTY OATH
Harold Fields, a Florida resident, brought suit in the state trial court
seeking to enjoin state officials from enforcing a voter loyalty oath re-
quired of all prospective registrants.' The complaint charged that the
loyalty oath represented: (1) an abridgement of his first and fourteenth
amendment rights under the United States Constitution and (2) a denial
of equal protection of the law to the class of persons of which he is a
member. Defendant Askew contended that states have the power to deter-
mine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised
and that the Florida loyalty oath is in no way discriminatory on its face.
The trial court held for the defendant and refused to permit the plaintiff
to register without taking the oath. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court
of Florida, in this case of first impression, held, affirmed: the loyalty
oath does not conflict with either the state constitution or with the first
amendment or equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
Fields v. Askew, 279 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1973), appeal dismissed, 94 S. Ct.
905 (1974).
It is no coincidence that the three wars of extensive American in-
volvement, the Civil War, World War I and World War II, each spawned
various loyalty programs to seek out those disloyal to this nation.' In
times of stress, it is perhaps inevitable that "the herd instinct asserts it-
self by an urge toward conformity."3 Accusations of disloyalty against
those who hold extreme opinions are common and attempts to assure
fidelity to the state are numerous. When confronted with the constitu-
tionality of such loyalty programs and their corresponding oaths, the
United States Supreme Court has attempted to balance the government's
interest against that of the individual. In such cases, only if the govern-
ment can show that its interests are endangered, does it have the power
to protect itself at the expense of the individual's interest in the free
exercise of his constitutional right to vote.4
While the question of loyalty oaths has long been the subject of legal
1. The plaintiff refused to take the oath. The defendant, accordingly, refused to register
him as a voter and indicated that he would continue to do so in the future. The statute in
question is FLA. STAT. § 97.051 (1971), which provides in part:
A person making application for registration as an elector shall take the following
oath: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will protect and defend the Consti-
tution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Florida . .. .
2. The loyalty oath was also used, for example, in France against the Hugenots and
during the Spanish Inquisition as a method of discovering "heretics." In America, they have
existed since the search for "Loyalists" during the Revolutionary War. In the aftermath of
the Civil War, state constitutions frequently required attorneys, teachers, officeholders and
voters to subscribe to an oath of past loyalty to the United States. Loyalty oaths reappeared
in the post-World War II era and reached a peak during the McCarthy investigations. See,
e.g., Note, The Requirement of Specific Intent-A Further Limitation on Loyalty Oaths,
21 Sw. L.J. 685 (1967).
3. Fraenkel, Law and Loyalty, 37 IOWA L. Rv. 153, 153 (1951).
4. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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controversy, 5 no other appellate court, state or federal, has ruled on the
constitutionality of a currently enforced statute making such oaths a
requirement for voter registration.6 The overwhelming majority of the
cases involving loyalty oaths have dealt with attempts by federal and
state governments to determine the fitness of potential employees for
public service.' On several occasions, the United States Supreme Court
has upheld this type of loyalty oath.' In other instances, the Court has
invalidated them.9
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Florida was confronted
with the state's voter oath and found it to be constitutionally valid. In
a very brief opinion, the court sought to support its position, in the ab-
sence of precedent, by citing Connell v. Higganbotham1° and Cole v.
Richardson," two recent United States Supreme Court decisions uphold-
ing loyalty oaths as a condition to public employment. The court further
referred to a section of the state constitution which requires each state
officer to swear to support the Florida Constitution before entering upon
the duties of his office."2 The particular portions of the cases cited by
Justice McCain, writing for the court in Fields, emphasize that the oaths
of support, as prerequisites to state employment, do not offend the first
and fourteenth amendments to the Federal Constitution."
5. See, e.g., Comment, Loyalty Oath-Key Sections of New York's Loyalty Statutes
Declared Unconstitutional, 19 S.C.L. REV. 422 (1967); Comment, The Loyalty Oath as a
Condition of Public Employment, 19 BAYLOR L. Rav. 479 (1967); Note, Loyalty Oath-
Specific Intent Requirement for Validity, 16 DE PAUL L. Rav. 209 (1966); Note, Loyalty
Oaths-A State Loyalty Oath Statute Which Fails to Require, as Part of the Membership
Clause, Specific Intent to Further the Illegal Ends of the Proscribed Organizations is Un-
constitutional, 12 VILL. L. Rxv. 363 (1967).
6. Only five states presently insist upon voter registration loyalty oaths: ALA. CODE
tit. 17, § 31 (1971); FLA. STAT. § 97.051 (1971); LA. CoNsT. art. 8, § 1(d); Miss. CONST.
art. 12, § 242; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-72 (1971).
7. For an example of numerous state statutes requiring loyalty oaths as a condition
to public employment, see Note, Positive Loyalty Oaths-The First Amendment and Aca-
demic Freedom, 14 WAYNE L. Rav. 635-36 n.4 (1968).
8. E.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (teachers required to deny their
membership in any organization advocating the overthrow of the government by force or
violence); Garner v. Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (affidavits compelling public em-
ployees to disclose their membership in the Communist Party) ; Gerende v. Election Bd., 341
U.S. 56 (1951) (oath requiring potential candidate for public office to stipulate that he is
not engaged in attempt to overthrow the government).
9. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) (statute must be restricted in scope to those
who join an organization with the specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the
organization) ; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (a state may not stifle first amendment
rights when the objective sought could be more narrowly achieved; nor may a state punish
"knowing but guiltless" behavior) ; Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instructors, 368 U.S. 278 (1961)
(oath will fail if vague or indefinite); Wieman v. Updergraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (a state
may not exclude persons from public service solely on the basis of organizational membership
without regard to members' knowledge concerning the organization's purposes or activities) ;
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867) (an oath may not operate as an ex post
facto law or bill of attainder).
10. 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
11. 405 U.S. 676 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Cole].
12. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 5(b).
13. 279 So. 2d at 823-24.
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The common factor underlying the cited authorities is their applica-
tion solely to those in public service, and although their language is sim-
ilar to that of the Florida voter loyalty oath, their raison d'9tre is not.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Cole declared:
We have ... recognized that the purpose leading legislatures to
enact such oaths, just as the purpose leading the Framers to our
Constitution to include the two explicit constitutional oaths, was
... to assure that those in positions of public trust were willing
to commit themselves to live by the constitutional processes of
our system .... 14
While it is clear that there is a valid governmental interest in requiring
an oath of public employees and officials, it is equally clear that a voter
is not in a position of "public trust," and, therefore, no similar govern-
mental interest exists.
The United States Supreme Court, however, recently upheld the
validity of a rule requiring applicants to the New York bar to swear an
oath to "'support the Constitution of the United States' as well as that
of New York."" The attorney, like the voter, "does not hold an office
or public trust in the constitutional or statutory sense of the term; '" nor
is he a state or county officer. 1 Unlike the voter, however, the attorney
is deemed an officer "of the court for the administration of justice,"'"
and, by his Code of Professional Responsibility, a "guardian of the law."' 9
An analogous situation, relied upon by the plaintiff Fields and ignored
by the court, was presented in West Virginia Board of Education v. Bar-
nette.2 0 There the United States Supreme Court stated that the action of
local authorities, in compelling the salute to the flag and the pledge of
allegiance, "transcends constitutional limitations on their power and
invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the
First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.'
In Justice Jackson's words:
14. 405 U.S. 676, 684 (1972) (emphasis added). Similarly, the instant defendant relied
upon two equally non-analogous cases in attempting to support its first amendment argu-
ment. In Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 36
(1968) (per curam), the district court upheld a New York teacher's oath on the grounds
that "[a] state does not interfere with its teachers by requiring them to support the govern-
mental institutions which shelter and nourish the institution in which they teach." Id. at 341.
In Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966), the Court held that a Georgia oath required of state
legislators merely called for the government officer to acknowledge his willingness to "abide
by constitutional processes of government." Brief for Appellee at 5-6, Fields v. Askew, 279
So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1973).
15. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 161
(1971).
16. In re Clifton, 115 Fla. 168, 170, 155 So. 324, 326 (1934).
17. In re the Fla. Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902, 907 (Fla. 1949).
18. FLA. STAT. § 454.11 (1971).
19. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBrrITY, Preamble.
20. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) [hereinafter referred to as Barnette].
21. Id. at 642.
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If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can proscribe what shall be ortho-
dox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
If there are any circumstances which permit any exception,
they do not occur to us now.21
The Court held that it was the purpose of the first amendment to avoid
attempts at compulsory unification of opinion which begin with the co-
ercive elimination of dissent and lead to the extermination of dissenters.25
To this end, Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, declared: "Words
uttered under coercion are proof of loyalty to nothing but self interest.
Love of country must spring from willing hearts and free minds. 24
Indeed, a statute which allows subversives, trained to commit perjury,
to take an oath and thereby qualify, for example, to vote, and which at
the same time disqualifies those who refuse to take the oath for reasons
other than disloyalty, does not accomplish any legitimate objective.25
An application of this reasoning to the instant case demonstrates
that the three bases asserted by the state in defense of the oath 2 -a de-
termination of good faith of its voters, protection of the purity of elec-
tions, and safeguarding against abuse of the elective franchise-are
rendered ineffective. To the prospective voter, who, for conscientious,
religious or political reasons, cannot take the oath, the restrictions on his
first amendment rights and the disenfranchisement that results hardly
seem justified.
Despite a first amendment mandate that Congress shall make no
law abridging the freedom of speech, press and assembly, the Supreme
Court has held that these freedoms are not absolute. Rather, they are
dependent on the need for constitutional government to survive; only
if the government can show that there is a grave and immediate danger
to interests which it may lawfully protect are the rights susceptible to
restriction. 28 The Supreme Court of Florida did not address itself to this
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 640-41.
24. Id. at 644. Similarly, the Court found unacceptable the proposition that the Bill
of Rights, "which guards the individual's right to speak his own mind, left it open to public
authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind." Id. at 634.
25. Mommer, State Loyalty Programs and the Supreme Court, 43 IND. L.J. 483 (1967-
68).
26. Brief for Appellee at 13, Fields v. Askew, 279 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1973).
27. Wiedman v. Updergraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
28. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); United States
v. Noto, 262 F.2d 501, 507 (2d Cir. 1958). In Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 49 (1919),
the defendant was appealing his conviction under the Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2388
(1970), for attempting to cause insubordination in the United States Armed Forces. The
defendant's contention was that he had committed no act, but only spoke, and that such
conduct was protected by the first amendment. While this may be true in normal circum-
stances, it was held that the character of every act must be judged according to the cir-
cumstances in which it was done. As Justice Holmes put it:
CASES NOTED
issue in Fields. It seems safe to conclude, however, that as no such danger
resulted from silence during a pledge of allegiance to the flag at the height
of World War II, when Barnette was decided, then, a fortiori, none exists
today as the result of silence during voter registration.
The second significant aspect of the instant case involves the right
to vote and the equal protection arguments under the fourteenth amend-
ment which arise from attempts to regulate it. The right to vote, like
the first amendment rights discussed above, is not absolute. The states
have the power to regulate access to the franchise through imposition
of voter qualifications." As a general rule, however, the Court has con-
sistently held that before the right to vote can be restricted, the "purpose
of the restriction and the assertedly overriding interests served by it
must meet close constitutional scrutiny. 30
The initial question in such cases is whether the limitations employed
by the state establish classifications. Where a conclusion is reached that a
particular restriction does not create a classification, the necessity for
considering the equal protection question is precluded-no classifications
are created to which the law might be unequally applied. The court in
Fields did not decide the classification issue. A conclusion may nonethe-
less be drawn that the loyalty oath in question creates two groups of
voters: those who are able to take the oath and are thereby permitted
to register and those who, for conscientious, religious or political reasons
are unable to take the oath and are, in effect, thereby disenfranchised.
Which of the two equal protection tests established by the United
States Supreme Court applies in judging the validity of the classification:
the stringent "compelling state interest" test or the more flexible "rational
basis" test?"1 Under the latter, the burden is on the citizen to show that
the statute he is attacking either has no reasonable relation to the achieve-
ment of some legitimate state end or that the classification created is
arbitrary. Absent such a showing, state laws are presumed to be consti-
tutional."2
The Court's decision in Shapiro v. Thompson"3 eliminates this test
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question
of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things that might be said
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that . . . no court could regard
them as protected by any constitutional right.
Id. at 52 (emphasis added); see also Debs v. United States 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frowerk
v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) ; Note, 16 DE PAUL L. REV. 210-11 (1966-67).
29. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 144 (1970); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89,
91 (1965).
30. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970).
31. McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 806-07 (1969).
32. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). The rational basis test is
justified on the ground that unless a fundamental right is involved, proper respect for the
legislature as a coordinate branch of government, as well as judicial restraint, require
a presumption of constitutionality. Id. at 420.
33. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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in situations where the classification touches on a "fundamental right."
In these instances, the "constitutionality [of the statute] must be judged
by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compelling state inter-
est," and the burden is on the state to overcome a presumption of uncon-
stitutionality."4 In essence, the state must prove that the classification it
has chosen not only nonarbitrary but necessary, 5 and that the interest
sought to be furthered is not only legitimate but compelling.8"
The holding in Shapiro raises the question as to whether the alleged
discrimination in Fields must be examined under the newer and more
stringent test. According to Shapiro, the test will have to be applied if
the right to vote is a "fundamental right." In the 1886 case of Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,8 7 the Supreme Court declared that "voting is regarded as a
fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.," This
principle was reaffirmed in Dunn v. Blumstein.89 The Supreme Court of
Florida in the instant case referred to the right to vote as "fundamental." 4
The final step is to link definitively this principle to the equal protection
clause and the appropriate test. In Kramer v. Union Free School Dis-
trict," Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, indicated that it
was no longer sufficient that a disenfranchising classification be rationally
connected with a legitimate state goal. He declared that:
If a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some
bonafide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies
the franchise to others, the court must determine whether the
exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.4 2
In 1972, when the Supreme Court last discussed this aspect of the
right to vote, in Dunn, it became apparent that the new composition of
the Court would not slow the trend toward expansion of the equal protec-
tion clause. In addition to adhering to the precise mandate of the above-
cited Kramer test,48 the Court in Dunn laid down the most stringent
standards to date for the states in defending equal protection challenges:
"To decide whether a law [has] violated the Equal Protection Clause,
we look . . . to three things: the character of the classification; the in-
dividual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental
interests asserted in support of the classification." 44
The Supreme Court of Florida left many questions unanswered in
Fields. In particular, it failed to determine the existence of either the
34. Id. at 638.
35. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
36. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
37. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
38. Id. at 370.
39. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
40. 279 So. 2d at 824.
41. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
42. Id. at 627.
43. 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972).
44. Id. at 334.
1974] CASES NOTED 735
"clear and present danger" or "compelling state interest" that would
justify the requirement of a voter loyalty oath and the resulting infringe-
ment on the fundamental right of free speech. Absent such a showing,
the Burger Court's adherence to the Warren Court's pronouncements,
regarding voters' rights, indicates that the burden of proving such an
overriding state interest will become increasingly difficult to meet.
RICHARD A. POPKIN

